Essay Five - Irresistible Grace
Thirty some odd years ago, I wrote a sentence I didn’t fully understand. It was buried in an undergraduate senior thesis on Jonathan Edwards, in a chapter I’d titled, with the kind of confidence only a twenty-something can manage, “Divine Emanation.” I was quoting Edwards on why a perfect, self-sufficient God would bother making anything at all:
“As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God... this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fullness, pour forth light all around.”1
I used that image to defend a doctrine engineered to hold an edge. The thesis was solidly Calvinistic, written by a solidly Calvinist young man, and the whole apparatus existed to explain why God’s effectual love reaches some people and not others. Grace was a fountain, sure. It was also a fountain with parameters around it, and as it turns out I was the one who’d set the parameters.
The sentence didn’t say that, exactly, and it still doesn’t. Hold onto that thought; we’re coming back to it.
What Dort actually said
The Synod of Dort, meeting in the Netherlands in 1618 and 1619 to settle this exact argument, gave the doctrine its precise shape. Irresistible grace, or more accurately, effectual calling: when God moves to save someone he has chosen, that call cannot finally be refused. Dort’s account keeps the person free throughout; what God changes is what the person wants. The elect are drawn, not dragged kicking and screaming. The will, volition, remains theirs. It has simply been remade to want what it previously had not.
Dort didn’t invent this from nothing, so let’s look at the texts before the argument proceeds. Jesus, in John’s gospel: everyone the Father gives him will come to him, and no one can come to him unless the Father draws him.2 Paul, in Romans 8, in an unbroken chain with no dropout clause: those God foreknew, he predestined; those he predestined, he called; those he called, he justified; those he justified, he glorified.3 Ezekiel’s new heart replacing a heart of stone is God’s own initiative language throughout, not a request waiting on a response.4 Whatever the doctrine gets wrong about resistance, the texts underneath it are real.
That’s the doctrine stated the way its own defenders would state it, and two things get lost almost immediately whenever “irresistible” gets attached to grace in conversation. The first is its scope: Dort never claimed grace works this way on everyone, only on those already chosen, which is a separate doctrine (unconditional election) acting behind the scenes to undergird this one.
The second is the one we need to pause on. Say “irresistible” to most people and they hear that the will doesn’t fight back, or worse, that there was never a real will there to fight with in the first place, just a puppet being moved around. That’s a woeful misreading of the doctrine’s intent. It was a misreading even inside the room at Dort, as it turns out. Resistance was never denied. It was accounted for, up close, by people who had thought long and hard about what a will actually is. Harder than most Christians do today.
The obvious counter-example people reach for is Paul: struck blind on the Damascus road, converted in an instant, no gradual softening visible anywhere in the text. Doesn’t that look exactly like the overriding of the will the doctrine claims not to be?
Only if resistance has to be slow to count as resistance. Paul’s own letters describe a man who was not neutral going in, a zealot doing what he was most convinced was right, with everything he had in him. The Damascus road didn’t bypass that will so much as overwhelm it with enough counter force to match and then exceed what it was already exerting in the opposite direction. Speed isn’t the same thing as coercion. A conviction can flip in an instant and still be a real reversal of what the person actually, finally wanted, once he saw what he’d been looking at the whole time. Paul spends the rest of his letters insisting he wasn’t dragged into anything. He was apprehended, his own word for it, borrowed straight from the Greek: “that I may lay hold of that for which I was also laid hold of.”5 That’s not quite the same claim as overridden.
Edwards, Locke, and what actually changes
Edwards read John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding at fourteen, in his second year at Yale, and said toward the end of his life that he’d studied it with more pleasure than “the most greedy Miser finds in gathering up handsful of Silver and Gold from some new discover’d Treasure.”6 That’s not simply incidental flourish. The book Locke wrote about the will became the book Edwards wrote about the will, decades later, with the theology attached. Locke’s argument, in the chapter he titled “Of Power,” is that the will isn’t moved by weighing options in some neutral courtroom of the mind. It’s moved by whatever “uneasiness” is loudest at the moment of choosing. You act on your strongest present desire, full stop, and asking whether that’s “free” is the wrong question entirely. The right question is what shaped that desire.
Edwards ran that psychology straight through Freedom of the Will, the same book this series leaned on for Total Depravity in “Neither Able Nor Willing.” That essay needed the distinction between natural ability and moral ability: the sinner has the actual equipment to believe, eyes and mind and capacity intact, and still won’t, because nothing in him wants to. It is, at that point, simply not his strongest inclination. Irresistible grace is the doctrine about what happens to that second half of the pair, the wanting itself, once grace gets involved.
Edwards’ own name for it was a new sense of the heart, and it shows up in my old college thesis in language I’d genuinely forgotten I’d cited. From the Miscellanies:
“The Godly man’s idea of God consists very much of these spiritual ideas... he comes to have the disposition of his mind changed, and to feel some of those operations of mind by means of which he gets those simple ideas, that he sees the beauty of them; so he gets the sight of the excellency of holiness and of God... regeneration is so often in scripture compared to opening the eyes of the mind, to calling out of darkness into marvelous light, enlightening the dark understanding.”7
Paired, in my own footnotes, with Ephesians: “by grace you have been saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God, not of works.”8 Regeneration, on this account, isn’t a new choice superimposed on the same person. It’s a new capacity to perceive something as beautiful that used to look like nothing at all, or worse, something repugnant. Once you see it that way, you don’t choose it the way you’d choose between two equally appealing entrees. You want it, the way you want water after a long walk.
Which is where my own aged footnote comes in, the one I quoted to Shawn-in-his-twenties’ surprise when I found it again last week:
“The monergistic work of God in regenerating the heart of a sinner is not to negate the creature’s freedom, but rather, it establishes his freedom. Prior to God’s intervention, the heart is a slave to sin, and can only obey its master. God, having freed the heart unto faith, allows the affections of the heart to be most greatly inclined toward God, thus freeing it to believe. Throughout, man is choosing precisely what he most wants, and thereby no violence is done to his free agency.”9
Read that passage again without the word “sinner” as the locus of attention and you have the whole corrective in one paragraph. The will fights here. The affections drag their feet. The old wanting doesn’t always die quietly, and Edwards never once pretended otherwise. What has a limit, on this account, is how long the fight can hold out once the object of desire has actually been seen for what it is. A person who has actually perceived something as beautiful doesn’t go on, indefinitely, preferring the ugly thing instead. That was never Edwards’ claim. Treating it as his claim is how “irresistible” gets equivocated into “involuntary” by the detractors.
The relocation
Dort kept grace irresistible and made the scope smaller, limited to those already chosen. What follows here keeps grace irresistible and makes the self-limiting circle disappear, not by weakening the word but by refusing to accept that it only ever described a subset. The question stops being whether grace can be resisted (spoiler, it can) and becomes how long the resisting can hold out (another spoiler, a long, long time, but not forever).
Hear me on this point. This is not Arminianism in stealthy form, and it’s critical to point that out right off the bat since the vocabulary can invite this confusion. Arminius held that grace could be finally and permanently refused, a real and standing no that God respects forever. Nothing here claims that position. The claim actually runs closer to the opposite conclusion: that grace cannot be finally refused by anyone, which is a higher and stronger view of grace’s power than either side of the old argument was defending. Dort and Arminius were arguing about how far grace reaches, and both sides thought it had its real limits. This is an argument, and not of my own making, about how long grace is willing to wait before it completes its work. (Yet another spoiler: grace wins.)
Edwards, it turns out, already had the ontology for this, even if he never drew the exact conclusion. His account of true virtue defines it as love to Being in general, not love to some subset of beings carved out in eternity. And the word he uses for what makes anything worth loving at all, excellency, gets defined with almost mathematical plainness: “being’s consent to Being.”10 A thing has excellency to the degree it agrees with existence itself, not with some gated portion of it. Apply that definition honestly and there’s no obvious place to stop the fountain’s effusiveness. Edwards built a metaphysics where value flows from agreement with Being as such, and then, when it came to grace, drew a boundary anyway. Peculiar. That’s the inconsistency I want to address, as an example of where the logic seems to have outrun the theologian. Talbott and Hart, coming up next, spend their sections explaining exactly why a boundary like that was never necessary to begin with.
Talbott’s case
Thomas Talbott makes the argument from the inside of the idea of freedom itself, in The Inescapable Love of God.11 Take a rational agent who fully and accurately understands what is actually good for them, no confusion, no deception, nothing clouding the picture. Can that agent freely and permanently refuse it, forever, as a genuine exercise of liberty?
Talbott’s answer is no, and the reasoning is much closer to logic than it is to sentiment. An eternally sustained refusal of one’s own actual good, fully seen, has more in common with damaged rationality (there are less kind words for it) than with freedom. Either the person doesn’t yet see clearly, in which case the refusal is still provisional and correctable, or something has malfunctioned in the very capacity to choose at all. A permanent no, from someone who actually understands what they’re refusing, describes a broken instrument, not liberty exercising itself.
This is the answer to the objection people tend to raise first, almost reflexively when confronted with the idea: doesn’t universal, eventually-irresistible grace violate free will? Talbott’s case says the better question goes the opposite direction. What kind of freedom requires the permanent possibility of choosing against your own clearly perceived good? Coherent freedom has room for resistance. It has no room for resistance that never, under any amount of clarity, comes to an end.
Hart’s case, and Edwards as the hinge
David Bentley Hart gets to a similar place by a different road, and the road matters, because it answers a different objection. In That All Shall Be Saved, Hart leans on Gregory of Nyssa’s fourth-century argument that a rational nature is, by its very constitution, oriented toward the Good.12 A will is made of that orientation toward the Good, the same way water is made of the disposition to seek its own level. A will that permanently and finally refuses its own proper end is failing to be fully what a will is, whatever heroic autonomy it imagines itself exercising in the meantime.
Where Talbott answers the “doesn’t this violate free will” objection, Hart is answering the “doesn’t justice require an eternal hell for the unrepentant” one. His response is that justice concerned only with punishment, indifferent to whether the punished are ever actually restored, isn’t justice in any sense Christian theology has historically meant by the word. It is, however, very close to the only sense of justice most evangelicals, Reformed ones especially, ever get exposed to: retribution, the ledger balanced and closed, nothing further owed to anyone. That’s a piece of the tradition’s answer, the part that survived the argument and quietly got mistaken for the whole of it.
A God who creates rational natures oriented toward himself and then allows that orientation to be permanently thwarted for some percentage of them, by whatever means, hasn’t achieved justice. He’s at best achieved a stalemate with his own creation, forever.
What’s fascinating is how close this is to ground Edwards already occupied. True virtue, for Edwards, is love to Being in general, a will rightly ordered toward the whole of what is rather than toward the self or some fragment of it. Hart arrives at teleological orientation through Gregory of Nyssa and technical metaphysics. Edwards arrives very near the same place through Puritan aesthetics and the doctrine of excellency. Different centuries, different vocabularies, the same underlying shape: a rational nature is for something, and being for that something isn’t incidental to what the nature is.
It’s fair to ask whether I’m doing something more self-interested here than historical observation, salvaging a hero I spent decades under before I left the tradition he anchored. Probably, a little. I’m not claiming Edwards believed exactly what I now believe; he plainly didn’t, and nothing here is meant to imply that claim. What I’m claiming is narrower, and I think still true: the logic he built to explain divine love ends up further along this road than the theology he defended with it ever let him travel. He stands, without knowing it, at a door his own thinking built and never walked through.
MacDonald’s fire
George MacDonald gave this idea its best image, in an 1867 sermon called “The Consuming Fire.”13 God’s love, MacDonald argued, works on a soul the way fire works on ore, burning until the dross is gone and only the refined metal is left. The fire doesn’t negotiate with what it’s burning off. It also doesn’t arbitrarily stop partway through.
That image binds resistance and inevitability together without making either one merely decorative, which the philosophical arguments alone can’t quite do. The dross is real. It burns slowly, and it burns painfully, and calling the process a fire rather than a conversation is MacDonald’s way of refusing to pretend it’s easy or painless.
Nobody talks their way out of a furnace with only a clever objection. But a furnace that runs forever isn’t a furnace. A furnace has a job: turn ore into metal, then stop, because the job is finished. Something that burns without ever finishing has stopped refining anything. It’s just burning for an audience: proof of God’s power with no further purpose or telos. MacDonald’s whole argument is that God isn’t in the business of that kind of eternal, capricious exhibit.
This is what people often skip when they hear the word “universalism” and assume it means everyone gets waved through unbothered and unadulterated. MacDonald’s fire is hell’s actual content, minus the part we’ve added where it never ends, every bit as severe while it lasts. Whatever obstinance a person brings into the encounter with God gets burned out of them. The refining is neither optional nor comfortable. It is, eventually, finished. God always gets his man, or woman. All of them.
The fountain, again
Go back to the sentence I wrote at twenty-two, the one I didn’t understand:
“this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fullness, pour forth light all around.”
I built a doctrine around that sentence that stopped at the elect, because that was the doctrine I learned, and I hadn’t yet thought to ask the sentence what it actually said. It never specified a boundary. It doesn’t name a limit, a subset, a chosen few standing inside a fence while the rest of creation watches the light stop short of them. It says all around. That’s the whole phrase. Two words I quoted, footnoted, and walked straight past for better than thirty years, because I presupposed what the doctrine was meant to articulate before I let the sentence finish its own thought and move toward its logical conclusion.
I don’t think I was wrong to find that image beautiful in my twenties. I think I was quite wrong about its radius, though. The fountain doesn’t know how to stop at the elect, and it never did. It just took me a quarter century to stop telling it where the boundary had to be.
Edwards said something else, in the same restless run of Miscellanies entries, that I found again while double-checking my own old citations: “’Tis no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain that it is inclined to overflow.”14 He meant it as a small defense of why a self-sufficient God would bother creating anything at all. He wasn’t wrong insofar as it goes. He just never seemed to ask what an infinite fountain inclined to overflow is supposed to do when it finally reaches a barrier.
Endnotes
1. Jonathan Edwards, Concerning the End for Which God Created the World, in Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 8, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 432-33.
2. John 6:37, 44, NKJV.
3. Romans 8:29-30, NKJV.
4. Ezekiel 36:26, NKJV.
5. Philippians 3:12, NKJV.
6. Samuel Hopkins, The Life and Character of the Late Reverend, Learned and Pious Mr. Jonathan Edwards (Boston, 1765), quoted in Paul Copan, “Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophical Influences: Lockean or Malebranchean?,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 44, no. 1 (2001): 108.
7. Jonathan Edwards, The Miscellanies, in Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 13, ed. Thomas A. Schafer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), #123:287.
8. Ephesians 2:8-9, NKJV.
9. Shawn Connelly, Divine Emanation: The Exhibition and Acknowledgment of God’s Love in the Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards (unpublished undergraduate thesis), footnote 40.
10. Jonathan Edwards, The Mind, in Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 6, ed. Wallace E. Anderson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 362.
11. Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014).
12. David Bentley Hart, That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).
13. George MacDonald, “The Consuming Fire,” in Unspoken Sermons, First Series (London: Alexander Strahan, 1867).
14. Jonathan Edwards, The Miscellanies, vol. 13, #94:262.




“The fountain doesn’t know how to stop at the elect, and it never did. It just took me a quarter century to stop telling it where the boundary had to be.” Beautiful. Thank you.
I've reached the point in reading your fascinating writings where I have to go back to scripture and ask "what about?" questions. I won't insult you by telling you what they are. You already know. Worms dying not, and similar.